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As the financial crisis of 2008
fades into history, most people
have remained confused about
the causes of
this economic
tsunami. Since
the nature of the
train wreck goes a
long way towards
explaining the
present stagna-
tion of the U.S.
economy, this is
unfortunate.
A large part of the confusion
lies in the partisan wrangling
about the roots of the crisis.
BethanyMcClean and Joe
Nocera have written the most
balanced and comprehensive
account of the evolution of this
cataclysm.
The starting point is the idea
of financial leverage, simple
in concept, if often complex in
implementation.
In finance you use leverage
by purchasing an asset with
borrowed funds. The advan-
tage is more of the asset can be
purchased and any gains in the
asset’s value go to the buyer.
The danger is that the borrower
won’t be able to repay the debt.
This credit risk is at the core
of all lending decisions. Lenders
protect themselves from credit
risk in three ways.
First, they try to only lend
to borrowers who will repay
the loan. (credit evaluation)
However, even the most careful
lender will make mistakes, so
lenders backstop themselves
with two added protections.
The try not to lend too much to
any one borrower (diversifica-
tion), and they don’t commit
every possible dollar to lending.
(capital reserves)
Each of these has a role in the
story of the financial crisis.
Let us start with capital
reserves. Lenders know they
need to maintain the safety
margins capital reserves rep-
resent. However, the reserves
do not earn anything, so there
is a continuing pressure to use
capital reserves.
One of the lessons of the Great
Depression was that lenders
tempted by profits do not keep
adequate capital. So, since
the 1930s lenders have been
required by law to maintain cer-
tain minimum levels of reserves.
This results in continual gaming
of the legal capital requirements.
One method of reducing
required capital is to demon-
strate the risks of your lending
are low. If your loans as a group
are mostly unrelated, then
diversification means you are
less at risk than a lender with an
equal amount of money loaned
to very similar borrowers.
Traditional mortgage lenders
usually made their loans to
borrowers in a single geographic
area where an unfortunate event
(say a plant closing) could cause
lots of defaults. By bundling
mortgages frommany areas in
the country, diversification was
achieved and risks lowered.
However, something impor-
tant was lost.
Local lenders had both the
ability and the incentive to
judge the creditworthiness of
borrowers. When loans began
to be made on a national basis,
both of these were lost. There
was a replacement available in
the form of the national credit
rating agencies. However, their
incentives were thoroughly per-
verted by the gusher of money
unleashed by mortgage securi-
tization.
Beyond this, practices were
embraced in the name of diver-
sification that had no relation-
ship to actually reducing the
risks of lending. In particular,
the process of creating new
securities by bundling poor
credit risks from several distinct
sources resulted in increased
risks since these securities were
even more likely to default.
In effect, all of the traditional
protections against bad lend-
ing were forfeited in the rush
to exploit the phony diversifica-
tion of securitization.McClean
andNocera lay this all out in
painstaking detail. They also
do so without the partisan axe
grinding that characterizes so
much that has been written on
this subject.
It’s highly recommended
reading.
Dr. John H. Brown is an associate
professor in the School of Economic
Development at Georgia Southern
University. Dr. Brown can be reached
at jbrown@georgiasouthern.edu.
“All the Devils are Here: The Hidden
History of the Financial Crisis,” by
Bethany McClean and Joe Nocera.
2010, Penguin Books, New York.
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Parker honored
as ‘innovator’
Business in savannah
Parker’s convenience stores’ tech-
savvyapproachtoitsbusinesshas led
a foodservice indus-
try tradepublication
to name the com-
pany’spresidentand
CEO, Greg Parker,
asconveniencestore
“Innovator of the
Year” for the south-
east region.
The Gr i f f i n
Report of Food Marketing picked
theSavannahbusinessmanbecause
of his “unique take on operating
practices such as product selection,
inventoryandmanagement,”accord-
ing to spokesmanMike Berger.
A featureonParkerwill appear in
a future issue of the publication.
Another trade publication, Con-
venience Store Petroleum, or CSP
for short, profiled Parker recently,
dubbing him the “Profit Prophet.”
Thepiece examineshowhis 21 area
conveniencestoresconsistently rank
among the nation’s most profitable
according to National Association
of Convenience Stores data.
“We’re doing a lot of new stuff,
and I’m honored by the recogni-
tion,” Parker said. “We really are
innovative.We’re doing things that
nobody else is doing.”
Adam Van Brimmer
Parker
